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range of experience within an holistic epistemic setting. However, the book
neglects religious experience within Chinese religious traditions, eastern
religions more broadly, and non-Christian theistic religions. The Chinese
subjects introduced are usually converts to Christianity or missionaries
and, if not, at least invoked when they speak in favour of Christianity—
as are the practitioners of Eastern religions more generally (140, 232, 234,
218–219, 268, 271). The monism more prevalent in Eastern religions is rejected quickly towards the end of Chapter 17. As for Judaism, the case of a
secular kibbutznik becoming a religious Jew after a mystical experience is
presented (260–261), but along with the case of Weil’s conversion to Christianity (259–260). Religious experience within Islam receives a single mention (271).
On a few minor points, the indices are incomplete, and the book includes quite a few formatting errors, particularly in the offsetting of various items in lists or principles (72, 78, 80, 81, 126) and other typographical
errors, including an error in the header of every other page in Chapter 8.
While advancing the debate about religious experience, Kwan acknowledges that his book will not be conclusive, particularly because of the
limitations of space provided by a single volume. Skeptical readers will
likely not be persuaded by this book. This owes in part to the sheer number of arguments and topics raised (and that then cannot be adequately
addressed), but also to particular problems with the arguments, some of
which I have identified in this review. However, to conclude that this is
not a good book because it is not conclusive would be to commit something analogous to a super-reliability fallacy. After all, the book is often
insightful, and even where the arguments do not persuade, they provoke
much thought. The book will be of interest to philosophy students and
philosophers of religion, particularly those working on religious experience and related topics in epistemology.

Inquiring About God: Selected Essays, Volume, 1 by Nicholas Wolterstorff,
edited by Terence Cuneo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
313 pages. $85 (hardcover).
Practices of Belief: Selected Essays, Volume 2, by Nicholas Wolterstorff, edited
by Terence Cuneo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 435 pages. $85 (hardcover).
R. T. MULLINS, University of St Andrews
As I discussed with some graduate students at my university that I would
be working on a review of Wolterstorff’s essays, they immediately became
interested but asked, “When will a collection of his essays on theological aesthetics become available?” What this question indicates is the wide
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breadth of topics that Wolterstorff has worked on over the years. He has hit
on issues in metaphysics, ethics, philosophy of religion, epistemology, and
aesthetics. This two-volume collection of essays gives us a good sampling
of Wolterstorff’s works on philosophy of religion and epistemology. The
aim of both volumes is to present essays that can represent Wolterstorff’s
views on a topic without overlapping significantly with other essays in
the collection. Neither claims to be an exhaustive or systematic treatment
of Wolterstorff’s thoughts. I wish to highlight a few of the themes throughout each volume.
Inquiring About God, Volume 1, contains an introduction and thirteen essays
on philosophy of religion and philosophical theology. Twelve of the essays
have been previously published in various journals and books over the
years. Chapter 10, “Is God Disturbed by what Transpires in Human Affairs?” has not been previously published. Throughout this volume, Wolterstorff engages in dialogue with major thinkers such as Kant, Aquinas,
Augustine, Anselm, and Barth to name but a few. What makes Wolterstorff
such an important philosopher is the way he engages these thinkers. His
approach is first to explicate a dialogue partner’s view with careful attention to her philosophical assumptions well before seeking to critique or
appropriate her position. “Thou must not sit in judgment until thou hast
done thy best to understand. Thou must earn thy right to disagree” (302).
Even though this is primarily a volume on philosophy of religion, one will
find interesting discussions on epistemology, emotion, philosophy of language and interpretation, as well as philosophy of time.
Chapter 1, “Analytic Philosophy of Religion: Retrospect and Prospect,” offers reasons why one should do analytic philosophy of religion.
The thrust of his answer is not that analytic philosophers seek clarity and
rigor—though they do seek such things—but instead that the analytic tradition is an important narrative within the history of twentieth-century
philosophy. Wolterstorff tells the tale of Locke’s epistemology, Russell
and Moore’s realism overthrowing the popularity of Hegelian idealism,
as well as the collapse of logical positivism and classical foundationalism. The collapse of positivism and classical foundationalism made way
for analytic philosophy of religion and reformed epistemology (a theme
discussed at length in Volume 2). Wolterstorff also notes that as analytic
philosophy of religion has flourished, so has the study of medieval philosophy and theology. Analytic philosophers of religion prefer to have
conversations with thinkers like Anselm instead of Kant.
Speaking of Kant, chapters 2 and 3 deal explicitly with Kant’s epistemology and how it has influenced theology. Chapter 2, “Is It Possible and
Desirable for Theologians to Recover From Kant?” answers in the affirmative. Part of the Kantian influence on theology and religious studies is the
notion that one cannot talk about God before she has established that it
is possible to even talk about God. On Kant’s epistemological scheme, it
is not possible to experience God. Further, God is outside of the realm to
which human concepts apply. This puts the theologian in a pickle, to say
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the least. If God cannot be experienced and our concepts do not apply to
God, it would seem that it is not possible to talk about God. Farewell to
theology then, or so it would appear. Wolterstorff offers an in-depth analysis of Kant’s epistemology and then shows where the weakness in this
scheme lies. In chapter 3, “Conundrums in Kant’s Rational Religion,” he
offers further reasons to reject the Kantian scheme by showing that Kant’s
moral foundation for religion is internally incoherent.
After clearing the Kantian dust from the theological ground, Wolterstorff begins to move into the realm of philosophical theology by way of
an engagement with medieval thinkers. Chapter 5, “Divine Simplicity,”
offers an excellent articulation of divine simplicity set against the backdrop of medieval ontology. One of the main difficulties that Wolterstorff
draws out is that it seems to be impossible to predicate anything of a
simple God. Chapter 7, “God Everlasting,” and chapter 8, “Unqualified
Divine Temporality,” extend Wolterstorff’s critique of divine simplicity
and begin his critique of divine impassibility by way of rejecting the doctrine of divine timelessness. One of Wolterstorff’s moves is to argue that
the claims of scripture are prima facie incompatible with a timeless God.
Nothing in scripture will lead one to think that God is timeless. Instead,
one must offer good reasons for thinking that God is timeless and then
offer a plausible way to interpret passages of the Bible that make it appear
that God is acting in history.
Another move by Wolterstorff is that a timeless God cannot know what
time it is now, cannot remember the past, nor make plans for the future.
Within this argument, Wolterstorff is assuming presentism—an ontology
of time where only the present moment exists—and that in order for God to
be omniscient He must have some sort of perceptual awareness of what is
going on in the world. Interestingly, the medievals would only agree with
Wolterstorff on the first assumption about presentism (e.g., St. Augustine,
Confessions XI.20. Anselm; Monologion 21, 22, and 24; also, Proslogion 13, 19,
and 22). They would disagree with him on the second assumption about
omniscience. As Boethius’s Consolations of Philosophy makes clear, “how
absurd it is that we should say that the result of temporal affairs is the
cause of eternal foreknowledge!” (V.147; also see Augustine, On the Trinity
6.11; and On Genesis 5.18.6). They would hold that God is omniscient by
having a perfect knowledge of Himself, and in no way is this dependent
upon the world. It is clear that Wolterstorff would disagree with the medievals over the nature of omniscience.
Wolterstorff’s other main argument against divine timelessness is that
a timeless God cannot be referred to since God would come to have an
accidental property, and thus be temporal. We not only can refer to God,
we do so all the time; thus, God is temporal. The medievals would seem to
agree with Wolterstorff’s starting point, but would not accept his conclusion. Peter Lombard claims that in referring to God the accidental property befalls the creature and not God, thus preserving God’s timelessness
(Sentences Book I, Dist. VIII, XXX, and XXXIX).
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Chapter 10, “Is God Disturbed by What Transpires in Human Affairs?”
furthers the critique of impassibility and begins to examine the problem of
evil. Wolterstorff brings out an internal conflict within Aquinas’s view on
the matter. Aquinas seems to hold the following three premises. (1) God
is not disturbed by evil. Not having passions is a perfection. (2) A person
is morally excellent if she sorrows over an evil. She is morally deficient if
she does not. (3) God is aware of the evil in the world. It would seem that
if God is aware of evil and is not disturbed by it, He is morally deficient.
The first volume concludes with chapter 13, “Tertullian’s Enduring
Question.” Tertullian famously asked what Christian theology should
do with pagan philosophy and literature. Wolterstorff compares Tertullian’s method with Clement of Alexandria’s approach to philosophy and
Christian theology. He then seeks to articulate his own answer as to how
contemporary Christian scholarship should take place. What makes this
paper a great conclusion to the first volume is that upon reading it one will
find that Wolterstoff has clearly exemplified this method throughout all of
the previous essays.
In Practices of Belief, Volume 2, the focus is on epistemology. Like the
first volume, this collection contains several previously published papers,
yet many of these have been heavily revised. Of the fifteen essays, five
are previously unpublished, giving this volume the bragging right to be
considered the most recent comprehensive statement on reformed epistemology. In this volume you will see Wolterstorff interact with thinkers
like Hilary Putnam, Immanuel Kant, John Locke, Thomas Reid, William
Alston, Alvin Plantinga, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Roderick Chisholm as
well as many others.
In chapters 1, “The World Ready-Made,” and 2, “Does the Role of Concepts Make Experiential Access to Ready-Made Reality Impossible?,”
Wolterstorff sets out to clear the ground of metaphysical anti-realism and
Kantian skepticism before turning his attention to the concept of entitlement
in chapters 3 through 5. Chapter 6, “Epistemology of Religion,” begins his
examination of classical foundationalism, natural theology, the evidentialist challenge to religious belief, and reformed epistemology. After this he
focuses on various ideas within the epistemology of Thomas Reid in chapters 14 and 15. The volume concludes with a delightful postscript where
Wolterstorff reflects on his life in philosophy. Some of the stories he tells in
the postscript are entertaining as well as illuminating.
The tale of reformed epistemology (RE) is an interesting and controversial one. RE is in part a rejection of three things: classical foundationalism,
the evidentialist challenge to religious belief, and the doxastic ideal. The
evidentialist challenge rests upon classical foundationalism, so part of the
thrust of RE is to show that classical foundationalism is incoherent. The
doxastic ideal claims that beliefs should be grounded in acquaintance, or
logically derived from acquaintance, or based upon probabilistic evidence.
Locke and other Enlightenment figures argued that this doxastic ideal applied to everyone and every belief. As Wolterstorff argues, RE follows
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David Hume and Thomas Reid by rejecting the view that the ideal reflects
the way human persons actually form beliefs. For instance, many of our
beliefs are formed on the basis of testimony, and the ideal fails to consider
this. RE claims that the ideal fails to hold not only for everyday beliefs, but
also for religious beliefs.
RE is not only a negative project in epistemology. It is not simply the
rejection of previous ideas. RE seeks to offer a positive account as well.
Various RE thinkers focus on different epistemological merits, such as
justification and warrant. Wolterstorff’s work focuses on the merit of entitlement as it relates to rationality. Are theists entitled to their religious
beliefs? Is there some epistemic obligation that they have failed to meet?
When it comes to discerning if someone is entitled to her belief, one must
discern if she has fulfilled her epistemic duty. This depends on various
factors and belief dispositions that a person has. For Wolterstorff, there is
no doxastic ideal for the ethics of belief that cuts across all persons, places,
and times. “Obligations to employ practices of inquiry are personally situated obligations” (111). In employing a practice of inquiry, one must choose
from among practices that are socially and personally acceptable, as well
as personally accessible (102–103). As such, whether or not one is entitled
to her belief is a complex person-situated matter.
Further, we often assess the rationality of our beliefs after we have
formed them. Part of being entitled to a belief is assessing the beliefs that
we find ourselves having. Our beliefs are “innocent-until-proven-guilty”
(257). Being entitled could mean that a person has considered various arguments against her belief and found her belief unscathed. Or it could
involve her deliberately intervening in the formation of one of her beliefs.
The only way we can discern if she is rational is by scrutinizing her individual belief system and the way she has used her noetic equipment (262).
Both volumes contain valuable discussions for those interested in philosophy of religion, philosophical theology, and epistemology. Each would
be useful for supplemental reading in a course on philosophy of religion
or religious epistemology. Volume 2 is especially important for those who
are researching reformed epistemology. Both volumes are a must have for
those who are enamored with Wolterstorff’s writings.

Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: Theism and the Problem of Animal Suffering, by
Michael Murray. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 206 pages. $70.00
(cloth).
Joseph J. Lynch, California Polytechnic State University
Michael Murray has written a provocative and challenging work on an issue that is often passed over far too quickly in discussions of the problem
of evil. In this work he gives the problem of animal suffering the attention

